Located on the border between China and North Korea, the New Yalu River Bridge has been completed for over 10 years, yet it remains unopened and abandoned.
However, since last February, a customs building has been constructed on the North Korean side, and construction and maintenance of the surrounding infrastructure have been underway, indicating movement towards its opening.
This change implies more than just the resumption of trade.
The construction of the New Yalu River Bridge was a project led by China under the pretext of expanding China-North Korea trade. When China first proposed building the bridge in 2006, North Korea turned down the proposal due to a lack of actual domestic demand as well as concerns about China’s potential military use of the bridge, specifically a possible large-scale Chinese military advance into the North in the event of a contingency.
In 2010, China once again proposed to not only build the bridge but also to fully support the construction of overall infrastructure on the North Korean side including customs facilities, roads, and railways at no cost. This time, Kim Jong-il accepted the deal outright, intending to use it as a showcase for his achievements.
The construction of the bridge was completed in 2014, but China did not keep its promise regarding the infrastructure investment for North Korea, citing budget overruns as the reason.
In 2015, North Korea selected the infrastructure construction in this area as one of the “100 construction targets” and attempted to attract private investment from China to complete the construction, but it fell through due to China’s uncooperative stance. As a result, the New Yalu River Bridge has remained a symbol of the lack of trust between China and North Korea, unable to fulfill its intended function for over a decade.
Given this background, what do the recent construction works imply? While they could be interpreted as a signal for the restoration of the strained China-North Korea relations, resulting from the North’s closer alignment with Russia, behind them lies the sharp strategic intent of both sides.
First, China will aim to regain its strategic influence over North Korea and promote the stabilization of its northern region.
Rumors that China is funding the construction costs of the customs facilities on the North Korean side currently underway support this assessment. On the other hand, North Korea’s primary goal will likely be securing economic benefits through expanded trade with China, based on its confidence in its advanced nuclear and missile capabilities.
In fact, the relationship between the two countries, despite its outward appearance of a “blood alliance,” is marked by a history of distrust and containment.
When China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, North Korea felt an intense sense of betrayal, and Kim Jong-il was so enraged that he even ordered to review the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Also, during the Arduous March in the North in the mid-1990s, China, contrary to North Korea’s expectations of economic support, deployed elite troops of the People’s Liberation Army to the border region. This not only represented a simple economic disregard, but also deepened political and military distrust between the two.
Even under the Kim Jong-un regime, North Korea has been openly expressing anti-Chinese sentiment, referring to China as “the Chinese” in a derogatory manner in internal documents.
This reveals a deep-seated structural distrust that goes beyond mere emotional outbursts. China, too, has long viewed North Korea not as a strategic partner, but as a subject for “management” and “control,” perceiving it as a potential risk factor.
Recently, North Korea has been expanding its political, military, and economic ties with Russia, effectively reinforcing its shift away from China in its foreign policy.
On top of that, the possibility of a US-North Korea summit being discussed adds to China’s concern, making it believe that uncertainty is growing in the China-North Korea border.
If North Korea were to break free from China’s sphere of influence through improved relations with the US, the China-North Korea border could become a structural vulnerability for China’s security. Amid escalating military tensions regarding Taiwan, the uncertainty in the northern region poses a risk that China cannot afford to bear.
In this context, the recent movements around the New Yalu River Bridge may be China’s strategic move that even takes into account the possibility of its physical intervention in North Korea.
This bridge is not just a simple logistics infrastructure, but a “strategic penetration asset” that could be used as a pathway for establishing a pro-China regime in Pyongyang or deploying direct military force in the event of a contingency such as the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime.
The reason why this bridge has not been used until now may also be due to China’s management of it as a “strategic reserve asset” rather than a regular trade route. Ultimately, the resumption of infrastructure construction on the North Korean side of the New Yalu River Bridge is not just a signal for the resumption of trade. While the construction is apparently being led by North Korea, it is highly likely to reflect China’s intention to reorganize its complex relationship with North Korea, and reinforce its strategic influence over Pyongyang behind the scenes.
North Korea has deliberately delayed the opening of the New Yalu River Bridge since the early stages of discussion, aware and fearful of China’s hidden intentions. However, recent trends seem to indicate Kim Jong-un’s confidence in maintaining the regime based on nuclear power, as well as the urgency of resolving economic difficulties. If the New Yalu River Bridge is opened in the future, we must all pay close attention to how it will be used over time.